Building silience through policy: The role of social safety nets

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Building robust social safety nets during calm to a scan ease strain for the most vulnerable during crises. When politional makers work are duce high public debt, social safety nets are an essential complex artion. The euro and sovereign debt crisis exposed deep-rooted policy vulnerabit as and economic imbalant. Restoring fiscal soundness and market trust in government policies involved unpopular adject cuts, resulting in a complex undertaking and profound social consequences. Our means demonstrates the critical role of well-mablished safety nets in mitigating the negative mpact of crises and macroeconomic apport programmes on household incomes. A well-wined social safety cushion can fined social safety cushion cushi

Lequality in times of crisis

the financial stability of the euro area or its members. During crises, financial markets can doubt government policies and their capacity to repay debts by pressing the governments to reassess their policies. Governments needed to conduct macroeconomic adjustments that required fiscal savings to regain stable market access during the euro area debt crisis. Unpopular budgetary cuts can transform crisis resolution into a complex political, social, institutional, and economic endeavour beset by domestic challenges.


One of the key lessons learnt from the biggest financial assistance package provided during the euro area sovereign debt crisis^[1] is that sustainable fiscal adjustment requires more equitable distribution of adjustment costs. A more holistic and long-term approach would prevent the deepening of social inequalities and help secure broad-based support for necessary reforms. It would also facilitate the tasks faced by the policymakers by



alleviating preserve on the most vulnerable during the downturn.

To understand what have the rise in inequality during the sovered debt crisis, our research zooms in one we the crisis affected different income groups in Greece and Portugal, including the role layed by social safety nets. Or analysis of household income dynamics helps us drespolicy lessons beyond use one can extract when looking at aggregate indicators. In prominent and rely accepted inequality measure, the Gini coefficient, shows a reverse of a decline anequality trend in Greece at the start of the macroeconomic support program when then peaked around 2014. It only gradually returned to pre-crisis levels after the feed in Portugal, the inequality showed only a minimal uptick after the start of the economic sustant programme and the earlier decline in inequality resumed alreading 2014 (see Figure 1). While useful for cross-country and overtime comparison such a snapshood is to capture the complexity of the macroeconomic support programme and the underlying livers of inequality. Similarly, the significant drop in average household income conceals poortant distributional challenges faced by different income groups, particularly in Greece each

Figure 1 ar 2: Evolution of the Gini index including social ansfers over time an accuse outside outside of the Gini index including social ansfers over time and outside outsi




Notes: Figure 1 shows the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income after all social transfers. Figure 2 reports the average equivalised disposable income. The dots indicate the start of the financial support programme.

Sources: Eurostat and EU-SILC

Granular ata display social vulnerabilities

By differentiating social ansfer income from labour and mark ancome, and comparing the cases of Greece and Farugal, we can better understate the role of social safety nets in the evolution of income and equality during the soverign debt crisis (see Figure 3). Social safety nets and automatic obilisers should neld the most vulnerable during an economic downturn, yet the data underer pre-existing gaps in these systems and several pre-crisis vulnerabilities. In Greece, for the safety nets did not automatically provide adequate support, while in Portugal the safety nets did not automatically provide adequate support, while in Portugal the safety nets did not automatically provide adequate support, while in Portugal the safety nets did not automatically provide and robust shield.

Figure 3: Social transfers Ver time



Notes: The figure reports breakdown of social benefits (social exclusion, family-/children-, housing-, and education-related allowances; unemployment, sickness and disability benefit, excluding the old-age and survivors' benefits) grouped by decile. The reference period is starting in 2007.



Source: EU

Social exclusion benefits the usually geared towards preventing poverty for the lowest-income households. In Green, there is evidence that the co-crisis social exclusion benefits lacked targeting, being distributed not only to distributed households but also to middle- and high-income groups (configure 3). In configure 3). In configure 3. In configure 4. In come as the co

Unemployment benefits are key in maping househour income during crises when replacing labour income. Here wain Portugal and Green differ. Acting as automatic stabilisers since the onset of the crisis, unemployment benefits remained the relatively stable after the unemployment benefits remained the crisis oviding a cushion against the negative interest of the economic adjustments on household incomes. In Greece, unemployment support remained comparatively as important and stable. For example, in 2014, the avector annual unemployment benefits received by middle-income households was nearly be times higher in ortugal than in Greece. Limited coverage and lower amounts transfed into more unificant financial strain for Greek households.

eece and Portugal also approached family allowances differently. In Greece, family allowances were distributed across all income groups, with the highest-income families period. In Portugal, family allowances remained comparatively low, with the higher-income groups receiving fewer benefits, particularly after the 2010 reforms that tightened the income-related eligibility criteria. The comparison shows how better targeted support could have alleviated financial challenges for low-income households as well as fiscal pressures.

Policy analysis based on microdata highly relevant for fiscal decisions

The microdata reveal the value of well-established safety nets in mitigating the negative impact of macroeconomic support programmes on household income. We suggest that a



targeted and in the safety net can be well-suited to helping assuage inful economic changes. Current, rocial protection expenditures represent aroup 10% of euro area gross domestic produ (GDP) and are vital in supporting the position during economic distress.

While the pandemic and energorises have increased polic debt and put pressure on reducing social expenditures, any dijustments to eximp social safety nets should be done cautiously. Building a strong so to net durit mon-crisis periods can help policymakers avoid ad hoc changes triggred policymakers are and rising debt-to-GDP ratios during stress episodes. Policy implementation errors under market stress can extend adjustment periods, raise for any quirements, and increase social costs. Such microeconomic analysis can be policymal is design policies geared towards the protection of the most vulnerable policymal invaluable for the policy agenda regardless of the circumstance.

Acknowledge nents

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Farther reading

Cate M. Francova, O. Lang, V. (2025). The distributional implications of the ours areacrisis: Evidence from macroeconomic adjustment in Greece and Portugal. ESM Working Paper 67/2025.

Matsaganis, M. (2020). Safety nets in (the) crisis. The case of Greece in the 2010's. Social Policy and Administration. 54:587-598

OECD (2013), Greece: Reform of social welfare programs. OECD Public Governance Reviews. OECD Publishing.

Footnotes



- [1] In 2020, to SSM published an Independent Evaluation of the Finan Assistance provided to Green eled by Joaquín Almunía.
- [2] Cato, M., Francova, Lang, V. (2025), <u>The distributional in cations of the euro</u> area crisis: Evidence from acroeconomic adjustment in preece and Portugal. ESM Working Paper 67/2025.
- [3] Automatic stabilisers, like income wes and social defits, are elements of the tax and benefits system that help mitigate econe ic fluctuath as automatically without discretionary interventions from policymakers.
- [4] For comparison see Matsaganis, M. (2°), ety nets in (the) crisis. The case of Greece in the 2010's. Social Policy and Administration. 54. 3-598.
- [5] See e.g. OECD (2013), Greec Reform of social website or programs. OECD Public Governance Reviews. OECD Public Social website or programs.
- [6] See e.g. Oliveira, C. Augal, P., Raposo, P., & Reis, H. (202 Inequality in Portugal: 1986–2020. Institute for scal Studies.